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Abstract  The interactions between corporate governance and taxation are bilateral and biunique: in fact, on one side, the 
manner in which corporate governance rules are structured affects the way a corporation fulfills its tax obligations; on the 
other hand, the way tax designs (from the government perspective) and related tax strategies (from the corporation 
perspective) are planned influences corporate governance dynamics. For example, allowing corporations to keep two 
different and separate sets of books (one for accounting purposes, the other for tax purposes) makes it easier for tax managers 
to obtain both tax savings and promising financial statements even though a critical financial status is present. Therefore, the 
purpose of this research is to analyze the connection between corporate governance and strategic tax behaviors, investigating 
how corporate governance rules can reach a higher level of corporate compliance with the tax system. 
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1. Introduction 
When ([1]) launched the study of the agency problem (that 
managers appointed by shareholders may pursue their own 
interests) in the corporate setting, they were inspired by the 
role o f taxes in  diffusing ownership in  the American 
economy (e.g.[2]). This link between corporate governance 
and taxation has been neglected in subsequent decades as the 
study of these two important features of an economy became 
segregated. Corporate finance scholars have treated taxes 
only as market imperfect ions that influence capital structure 
and dividend policies, while public finance scholars have not 
incorporated the possibility of agency problems in their 
analyses. An emerg ing literature suggests that revisiting this 
link can generate new insights into the real effects of tax 
policies and the workings of corporate governance. The 
rediscovery of this link has been spurred by two 
developments. First, rising concerns over the proliferation of 
corporate tax shelters has led to greater interest in the 
mechanics and motivations for such transactions especially 
in the context of growing concerns about managerial 
malfeasance (e.g.[3];[4]). 
A  good  corporate governance env ironment  can  be 
achieved by policy makers through direct regulatory action 
or through tax laws. Tax law has three different objectives: (i) 
increasing the revenue for necessary governmental functions, 
(ii) red ist ribut ing  wealth  among  the society  and  (iii)  
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influencing specific behaviors. Tax laws may also have 
unexpected consequences, a tax provision with the mere 
objective of increasing the revenue of a specific country may 
also indirectly influence the behavior of certain individuals 
or entities (e.g.[5]). Therefore, tax laws can influence 
corporate governance dynamics direct ly (as a direct 
consequence of specific tax policy choices) or indirect ly (as 
an indirect consequence of the way the tax system operates).  
1.1. Corporate Governance and Taxation 
Sholes et al. ([6]) confirm that the state although not an 
investor shareholding companies, has a direct interest in the 
administration and the maintenance of good corporate 
governance by companies.[7], in  a literature review on 
agency theory, corporate governance and taxation, assert that 
the tax system can mitigate or amplify the corporate 
governance problems. But the inverse can also happen, 
where the nature of the corporate governance environment 
can influence the nature and consequences of the tax system. 
For many years the themes of taxation and corporate 
governance were considered antagonistic in  the literature, 
but recent studies have concluded that they are related 
themes, since some corporate governance mechanisms have 
an important influence on firms’ taxation. They pointed out 
the impact of tax systems on corporate ownership patterns, 
and how ownership patterns in turn constrain corporate 
taxat ion. They also describe how tax systems are 
increasingly influencing corporate decisions.  
[8] studying 51 American companies that had been 
penalized by the Internal Revenue Service for using tax 
shelters (through various offshore havens) and also had 
strong corporate governance tools, found that active tax 
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shelter firms with strong corporate governance exhib it 
positive abnormal return performance while tax shelter firms 
with poor corporate governance exhibit  significantly lower 
abnormal returns.   
[9] present some considerations on tax management and 
planning of companies in the effort  to maximize profits and 
thus raise firm value. He asserted that companies need to 
take a holistic view of tax planning by considering all the 
effects rather than just immediate lowering of the tax liab ility 
because of the high tax burden. According to him, the best 
way fo r firms to maximize their value is to comply  with tax 
rules and focused on their core business rather than just 
seeking to lower their taxes. 
2. The Use of Tax Laws as a Regulatory 
Tool for Corporate Governance  
The use of tax laws instead of direct regulations allows the 
government to rely on an existing and established system 
(the tax system). The costs incurred by governments to 
slightly modify an existing and established system would be 
lower than the costs needed to create, manage and administer 
a new system (the regulatory system). In other words, the 
administrative costs incurred by governments would  be 
higher for putting in place a new regulatory system 
compared with the alternative of utilizing an existing tax 
system. Moreover, the fact that governments can rely  on a 
well known system is likely to increase the effectiveness of 
the process since the impact of tax rules on corporate 
governance dynamics would probably be faster than that of 
direct regulations. New direct regulations would require 
governments to create a new system for the implementation 
and supervision of the new regulations (e.g.[10]), increasing 
administrative costs and delaying the impact on corporate 
governance. 
Compliance costs would be less using pre-existing tax 
laws, since tax provisions are considered as less complicated 
than other provisions, because they are already established 
and thus known (e.g.[10]). Second, the use of the tax system 
rather than a regulatory system would promote the private 
decision making process of individuals. In fact, while the use 
of tax laws (and more specifically  of tax expenditures) would 
give a choice to taxpayers whether to comply with the policy 
request of the governments or not, direct regulations would 
not leave such choice to taxpayers, but to the government, 
favoring a government-centered decision making process. 
2.1. The Influence of Corporate Governance Rules on 
Tax Planning   
There are three reasons why public shareholders may not 
want managers to engage in strategic tax p lanning: 
1. In order to reduce risks of legal challenges and penalties, 
any transaction that does not have a real business purpose 
and is designed solely to avoid taxes has to be 
mischaracterized and obscured by managers. These opaque 
transactions make it harder for outside investors (current and 
future shareholders and bondholders) to control insiders 
(managers). Utilizing opaque transactions, smart tax 
managers may easily behave opportunistically maximizing 
their profits and causing ext ra costs unseen by the 
shareholders. As a result, corporate governance rules that do 
not guarantee strong transparency can benefit the private 
interests of mangers to the detriment of shareholders. The 
vice versa is also true: under good corporate governance 
rules which grant transparency, it is more d ifficu lt to shelter 
taxab le income. Thus, better corporate governance can 
reduce tax avoidance. 
2. The interest of investors in corporate social 
responsibility has extremely increased in recent years. Public 
investors seem to be interested in ethical behaviors of 
corporations. Therefore, good corporate governance which 
grants alignment of interests and transparency would prevent 
managers from engaging in strategic tax behaviors. 
3. [11] has suggested that corporations should always 
behave as if they are risk-neutral, even if shareholders are not, 
because shareholders have already diversified the risk by 
holding diversified portfolios based on the assumption that 
corporations are risk-neutral. 
Therefore, an alignment of interests, given by good 
corporate governance principles, would induce managers to 
behave as risk-neutral persons managing the corporation’s 
business.  
3. The Definition of Strategic Tax 
Behaviors: Tax Evasion, Tax 
Avoidance and Licit Savings of Taxes  
For the purpose of this study, strategic tax behaviors (or 
aggressive tax planning strategies) are all those actions 
designed solely to min imize corporate tax obligations whose 
legality may  be under doubt. Three categories of tax 
behaviors can be identified: tax evasion, tax avoidance and 
licit saving of taxes (e.g.[12]). Tax evasion can be 
synthetically defined as intentional illegal behavior, 
(behavior involving a d irect  violat ion of tax law, in order to 
escape payment of taxes). Licit saving of taxes can be 
defined as commonly accepted forms of behaviors which are 
neither against the law nor against the spirit of the law. Tax 
avoidance can be defined as all illegit imate (but not 
necessarily illegal) behaviors aimed at reducing tax liab ility 
which do not vio late the letter of the law, but clearly v iolate 
its spirit. The scope of each of these concepts varies from 
country to country depending on government’s policies, 
court decisions, tax authorities’ attitudes and public opinion. 
In this study, strategic tax behaviors are therefore all 
behaviors identified as tax evasion or tax avoidance.  
3.1. Transfer Pricing and Illicit Capital Flight 
The extent to which international financial liberalizat ion 
has facilitated capital flight to onshore and offshore financial 
centre is an important concern fo r many countries, developed 
and less developed. The Tax Justice Network has estimated 
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that capital flight from all countries, including funds 
undeclared in the country of residence, is approximately 
US$11.5 trillion (e.g.[13];[14]). Annual global income from 
such sources is conservatively estimated at US$860 b illion, 
and the annual world‐wide tax revenue lost is approximately 
US$255 b illion, which  equals the funds estimated to meet the 
UN Millennium Development Goals (e.g.[14]). Africa’s 
cumulated stock of capital flight for 1970–2004 has been 
estimated at USD 607 b illion, representing almost three 
times the continent’s external debt. The extent of the 
problem varies from country to country (e.g.[15];[16]). 
Employing a different method,[17] arrive at a figure o f USD 
854 billion for the period 1970–2008. Illicit capital flight can 
be reasonably estimated to be twice the level o f aid flows. It 
is hard to see how effective investment in productive 
capacity can take place as long as such vast amounts are 
being squandered by the region’s elites. In many countries, 
particularly in Sub‐Saharan Africa and Latin America, 
capital flight has been accompanied by increases in foreign 
borrowing which means , increased indebtedness has been 
used not to finance investment or even consumption, but to 
finance capital flight itself (e.g.[18]). The resulting debt 
burdens are most likely to hurt the poor, as social spending 
and infrastructural spending needs to be cut in the face of 
debt repayments.  
Estimates presented in Table 1 below show that over the 
39-year period Africa lost an astonishing US$854 b illion in 
cumulat ive capital flight—enough to not only wipe out the 
region’s total external debt outstanding of around US$250 
billion (at end of December, 2008) but potentially leave 
US$600 b illion fo r poverty alleviat ion and economic growth. 
Instead, cumulat ive illicit flows from the continent increased 
from about US$57 b illion in the decade of the 1970s to 
US$437 billion over the nine years 2000-2008 (e.g.[19]).   
Table 1.  Africa: Illicit  Financial Flows, 1970-2008 (in millions of U.S. Dollars) 
 
Group 
Total IFFs 
1970s 1980s 1990s 2000-2008 1970-2008 
Africa 57,291 203,859 155,740 437,171 854,061 
North Africa 19,161 72,020 59,813 78,742 229,737 
Sub-Saharan 38,130 131,839 95,927 358,429 624,324 
Horn of Africa 2,354 14,131 5,108 15,603 37,197 
Great Lakes 6,925 16,079 4,978 10,285 38,267 
Southern 5,894 20,581 31,447 116,828 174,751 
West and Central 22,956 81,047 54,394 215,712 374,109 
Fuel-exporters 20,105 67,685 48,157 218,970 354,917 
Nonfuel-exporters 7,867 26,517 22,375 23,342 80,102 
Group 
Average  IFFs 
1970s 1980s 1990s 2000-2008 1970-2008 
Africa 7,299 21,678 17,813 50,328 29,021 
North Africa 3,097 7,754 6,316 9,166 6,866 
Sub-Saharan 4,202 13,924 11,497 41,162 22,156 
Horn of Africa 249 1,421 715 1,949 1,183 
Great Lakes 745 1,778 580 1,286 1,142 
Southern 811 2,412 4,659 13,388 9,635 
West and Central 2,397 8,313 5,544 24,538 10,196 
Fuel-exporters 2,239 6,922 5,105 24,806 9,878 
Nonfuel-exporters 1,017 2,729 2,433 2,787 2,502 
Group 
Rates of Change (real 2008 CPI deflated) 
1975-1979 1980s 1990s 2000-2008 1970-2008 
Africa 18.9 -2.1 -4.8 24.6 12.1 
North Africa 14.0 -11.5 0.5 6.0 6.5 
Sub-Saharan n.a 1.3 -7.0 30.1 15.1 
Horn of Africa n.a 7.3 -15.5 33.5 20.0 
Great Lakes 13.2 -12.7 -17.7 35.0 13.5 
Southern n.a 13.5 7.3 21.5 16.7 
West and Central 21.5 0.0 -11.4 36.0 14.5 
Fuel-exporters n.a 2.2 -15.6 42.6 21.8 
Nonfuel-exporters n.a 11.3 -1.6 11.0 13.6 
Source: GFI (2012) 
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While the overwhelming bulk of this loss in capital 
through illicit  channels over the period 1970-2008 was from 
Sub-Saharan African countries, there are significant 
disparities in  the regional pattern of illicit flows. For example, 
capital flight from West and Central Africa, by far the 
dominant driver of illicit flows from the Sub-Saharan region, 
on average, fuel exporters including Nigeria lost capital at 
the rate of nearly  $10 billion per year, far outstripping the 
$2.5 billion dollars lost by non-fuel primary  commodity 
exporters per year. Annual average rates of illicit  outflows 
from Sub-Saharan Africa reg istered a sharp increase in the 
9-year period 2000-2008 relative to the earlier decades. On 
average, fuel exporters including Nigeria lost capital at the 
rate of nearly $10 billion per year, far outstripping the $2.5 
billion dollars lost by non-fuel primary commodity exporters 
per year. Table 1 also shows that real illicit flows from Africa 
grew at an average rate of 12.1 percent per annum over the 
39-year period. The rates of outflow in illicit capital for West 
and Central Africa (14.5 percent) as well as Fuel-exporters 
(21.8 percent) over the entire period 1970-2008 reflect 
substantial outflows from Nigeria and Sudan.  
3.2. Better Corporate Governance with a General Anti  
Avoidance Principle  
In the absence of an anti-tax avoidance provision and, in 
general, in the absence of strong tax enforcement policies, 
both managers and shareholders seem to have an advantage 
in engaging in aggressive tax planning. On the contrary, a 
general anti-avoidance rule, as well as other strong tax 
enforcement policies, would lower the return to tax 
avoidance strategies and would guarantee a higher level of 
transparency in the corporate governance dimension. 
Moreover, the higher transparency would reduce the amount 
of income d iversion, private benefits and would reduce the 
agency costs. In other words, since strategic tax behaviors 
reduce tax revenues and have a negative impact on corporate 
governance, an anti-avoidance rule may have a positive 
impact not only on tax compliance (i.e. guaranteeing a h igher 
level of compliance with the tax system), but also on 
corporate governance (since it would grant lower 
informat ion asymmetry between managers and shareholders 
and therefore lower agency costs and higher level of 
disclosure of informat ion). 
4. The Way Forward  
The capability to detect fraud or evasion is crucial to tax 
compliance. As it would not be practical to audit all cases, 
the fear of being caught would be sufficient to act as a 
deterrent. Tax officials should be exposed to adequate and 
continuous training; both at home and abroad, for a better 
understanding of recent domestic and international tax issues, 
which could then be utilized, to formulate successful tax 
compliance strategies. The working conditions of tax 
officials also need to be improved in order to motivate them 
to carry out their duties in a more efficient and professional 
manner. Much can be gained from studying how different 
countries have coped with tax reform: the solution reached 
may be different, but the basic problems that must be faced 
are often rather similar. Comparative analysis of tax reform 
experience around the world  may not provide a complete 
answer for any particular country, but it can help.  
5. Conclusions 
The historic divide between the study of taxation and the 
analysis of corporate governance appears to have obscured 
many fertile areas of research. While some issues at the 
intersection of taxat ion and corporate governance have 
received renewed attention in recent years (primarily due to  a 
concern with tax shelters and managerial malfeasance), 
taxat ion can also have significant implications for the 
various mechanisms that have arisen to ameliorate 
governance problems. In particular, the impact of tax 
systems on corporate ownership patterns, and how 
ownership patterns in turn constrain corporate taxation, 
appears to warrant further analysis, especially in an 
international and comparat ive setting.  
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